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Chapter 1: Introduction
In late 1764, while trying to repair a Newcomen steam
engine, the idea of allowing steam to expand and condense in
separate containers sprang into the mind of James Watt. He spent
the next 6 months in unceasing labor building a model engine. In
1768, after a series of improvements, Watt applies for a patent on
the idea; in August 1768 we find him in London about the patent,
and he spends another 6 months working hard to obtain the patent,
which he finally receives in January 1769. In 1775, after another
major effort supported by his business partner Boulton, Watt
secures an Act of Parliament extending his 1769 patent until the
year 1800. Burke spoke eloquently in Parliament in the name of
economic freedom and against the creation of unnecessary
monopoly – but to no avail. Boulton’s connections in Parliament
were too solid to be defeated by simple principle. In 1782, Watt
secured a further patent, made “necessary in consequence of ...
having been so unfairly anticipated, by Wasborough in the crank
motion.” More dramatically, in 1781, when the superior and
independently designed Hornblower machine is put into
production, Boulton and Watt go after him with the full force of
the legal system. In contrast to Watt, who died a rich man, the cost
of the legal battle was such that Jonathan Hornblower was not only
forced to close shop, but found himself ruined and in jail.
Prior to Watt’s beginning of commercial production in
1776, there are 130 steam engines in the U.K., most using the old
inefficient Newcomen design. By 1800, when Watt's patents
expired, there are at most 1000 steam engines used in the U.K., of
which only 321 are superior Boulton and Watt engines, the rest
being old Newcomen engines. The total horsepower of these
engines is 10,000 at best. In 1815, fifteen years after the expiration
of the Watt patents, it is estimated that 210,000 horsepower is
installed in England alone. After the expiration of the Watt patents
in 1800, not only is  there an explosion in the production of
engines, but steam power finally comes into its own as the driving
force of the industrial revolution. In the next 30 years steam
engines are modified and improved, and such innovations as the
steam train, the steamboat and the steam jenny all come into wide
usage. Most of the new improvements, such as those of William
Bull, Richard Trevithick, and Arthur Woolf, became available by
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The impact of the expiration of his patents on Watt’s
empire may be a surprise as well. Despite the fact that “many
establishments for making steam-engines of Mr. Watt's principle
were then commenced” never-the-less “it would appear that the
object principally aimed at was cheapness rather than excellence,
for they fell short as to performance of the Soho engines.” As a
result we find that “Boulton and Watt for many years afterwards
kept up their price and had increased orders.”
In most histories, James Watt is a heroic inventor,
responsible for the beginning of the industrial revolution. The facts
above suggest a different interpretation. Watt is a clever inventor
who, after getting one step ahead of the pack, remains ahead not by
superior innovation, but by clever exploitation of the legal system.
The fact that his business partner is a wealthy man with strong
connections in Parliament, is not a minor help.
The evidence suggests that Watt’s efforts to use the legal
system to inhibit competition set back the industrial revolution by a
decade or two. The granting of the 1769 and, especially, of the
1775 patents likely delayed the mass adoption of the steam engine:
innovation is stifled until his patents expire; and very few steam
engines are built during the period of Watt’s legal monopoly. From
the number of innovations that occur immediately after the
expiration of the patent, it appears that Watt’s competitors simply
waited until then before releasing their own innovations in an
effort to avoid the fate of Hornblower. Also, we see that Watt’s
inventive skills are badly allocated: we find him spending as much
time engaging in legal action in an effort to establish and preserve
a monopoly as he does in actual invention.
 Indeed, this story contains most of the important elements
of our argument  against intellectual monopoly. The sort of
wasteful effort to suppress competition and obtain special
privileges we have seen in Watt is one of the greatest dangers of
monopoly. It is commonly referred to as  rent-seeking behavior.
Watt’s attempt to extend the duration of his 1769 patent is an
especially egregious example of rent seeking: the patent extension
is clearly unnecessary to provide incentive for the original
invention, which had already taken place. On top of this, we see
Watt using patents as a tool to suppress innovation by his
competitors, such as Hornblower, Wasborough and others. Finally,
there is the slow rate at which the steam engine was adopted before
the expiration of Watt’s patent. By keeping prices high and
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and Watt hampered capital accumulation and slowed economic
growth. Intellectual property, as it is currently conceived, has other
damaging social effects but the three listed here and exemplified in
Watt’s story are the most serious ones: rent-seeking, innovation
suppression, and slow-down in the process of economic growth.
We shall see that Watt’s experience is the rule, not the exception.
Economists, beginning with Adam Smith – a friend and
teacher of James Watt – have carefully documented the problems
of monopoly. Because there are no countervailing market forces,
government-enforced monopolies are viewed as particularly
dangerous. Intellectual property legislation is one source of
government-enforced monopolies; however, economists have
generally argued in favor of patent and copyright protection.
Despite the many problems with government grants of monopoly
power, the argument is that without the promise of monopoly,
there would be insufficient incentive to innovate or create.
In the case of Watt, the argument goes, he would never
have invested the time and effort to create his invention without
the prospect of a patent. But that case is weak. Even after their
patent expires, Boulton and Watt are able to maintain a substantial
premium over the market by virtue of having been first, despite the
fact that their competitors have had thirty years to learn how to
imitate them. Moreover, when Watt developed his ideas and
models, it was far from certain that he would be able to get a patent
– at that time, getting a patent was an uncertain proposition – part
of the reason he had to lobby nonstop for a long time to get it.
Indeed, it may well be that the idea of obtaining a monopoly
occurred to Watt only after he finished his invention – there is no
evidence he gave any thought to patent law during the
development process. Finally, Watt had many competitors, such as
Hornblower and Wasborough; had he not invented the condenser,
it seems virtually certain someone else would have come up with
the idea in the 35 years between the time it occurred to Watt, and
the time his patents finally expired. Why this is not an isolated
episode and why the traditional case for the protection of
intellectual property is weak are two things we will argue through
both theory and evidence.
This book elaborates on the idea that intellectual property is
generally inhibiting to innovation, growth and prosperity. We
argue that not only would innovation thrive in the absence of
intellectual monopoly, but that we would enjoy greater growth and
prosperity in its absence. Our focus is on the economics ofBoldrin & Levine: Case Against Intellectual Monopoly, Chapter 1
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intellectual property: patents, copyright, and downstream licenses.
We are not seeking to understand what might and might not be
legitimate under the current legal system, but to understand how
laws and institutions might be crafted to encourage growth,
innovation and creation.
To understand what we mean by “intellectual monopoly,”
however, some understanding of the existing legal framework is
needed. There are three broad types of intellectual property
recognized in most legal systems: patents, copyrights and
trademarks.
Trademarks are different in nature than patents and
copyrights: they serve to identify the providers of goods, services
or ideas. We are unaware of any economic rationale for allowing
market participants to masquerade as people they are not, and there
are strong economic advantages in allowing market participants to
voluntarily identify themselves.  While we may wonder if it is
necessary to allow the Intel Corporation a monopoly over the use
of the word “inside,” in general we have little dispute with
trademarks.
Patents and copyrights, the two forms of intellectual
property on which we focus, differ in the extent of coverage they
provide. Patents apply to specific implementations of ideas –
although in recent years in the U.S. there has been decreasing
emphasis on specificity. Patents are of relatively short duration: in
the United States, 14 years for patents covering techniques of
manufacture, and 20 years for ornamentation. Patents provide
relatively broad protection: no one can legally use the idea, even if
they independently rediscover it, without permission from the
patent holder.
Copyrights are much narrower in scope, protecting only the
specific details of a particular narrative. They are also much longer
in duration – the life of the author plus 50 years for the many
signatory countries of the Berne Convention. In the U.S. there are
limitations on copyright not present in patent law: the right of fair
use allows the purchaser of a copyrighted item limited rights to
employ it, make copies of it and resell it, regardless of the desires
of the copyright holder. In addition, certain derivative works are
allowed without permission: parodies are allowed, for example,
while sequels are not.
In the case of both patent and copyright, there are two
important economic features. The first is what we call the right of
sale.  This is the right of a legitimate owner of intellectual property
to sell it. In copyright law, this right applied to the creator isBoldrin & Levine: Case Against Intellectual Monopoly, Chapter 1
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sometimes called the “right of first sale,” but the right of sale
extends also to the legitimate rights of others, for example,
licensees, to sell the idea. The second feature of the law is the right
to control the use of the intellectual property after sale. It is the
second that produces monopoly – enforced by the obligation of the
government to prosecute individuals or organizations that use the
idea in ways prohibited by the copyright or patent holder.
We emphasize that we favor the right of sale. It is crucial
that producers of intellectual property be able to profit from their
invention. While sales could take place even in the absence of a
legal right, markets function best in the presence of clearly defined
property rights. Not only should the property rights of innovators
be protected, but also the rights of those who have legitimately
obtained the idea directly or indirectly from the original innovator.
It is with the right of the owner of intellectual property to
control how the purchaser makes use of the idea or creation with
which we disagree. Because this right gives the owner a monopoly
over usage of the idea, we refer to it as intellectual monopoly to
distinguish it from the right of sale. Hence, intellectual property is
composed of two parts: the right of sale, and the intellectual
monopoly. The first gives the producer or any rightful owner of the
idea the power to sell to another party. The second gives the patent
or copyright holder the right to control and limit the usage of the
idea by any other person. The latter is not just a simple well-
defined right of property. It establishes a monopoly that we do not
usually allow producers of other goods. We will argue that this
monopoly creates many social costs, yet has little social benefit.
To foreshadow our argument, the original innovator has a
natural first-mover advantage by virtue of initially being the only
one to know of the idea or how to implement it. Furthermore, ideas
are always scarce. The innovator can invariably use his first mover
advantage and the scarcity of his idea to earn a profit. In the case
of Watt, the first-mover advantage was extremely strong. Even
after 31 years for competitors to reverse engineer his invention,
Boulton and Watt were still able to command a substantial
premium over the market. They were able to do so for many years,
by virtue of the special expertise that comes with having been first.
In thinking about abolishing intellectual monopoly, it is
important to recognize that even if existing copyright and patent
laws were abolished, much of their impact could be recreated
through private contracts. That is, in selling their idea, innovators
could require purchasers to sign a contract agreeing to make use of
it only in ways approved of by the seller. Shrink-wrap softwareBoldrin & Levine: Case Against Intellectual Monopoly, Chapter 1
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agreements are a simple and common example of this type of
downstream licensing. Notice that private agreements could not
completely recreate existing patent protection, since independent
invention could not be controlled. On the other hand, copyright
protection would effectively be increased, since current copyright
law obligates the seller to allow fair use, and this could be ruled
out in a private agreement. Indeed, the current legal situation is
murky, since some sellers do attempt to eliminate fair use through
downstream licensing agreements. In any case, to implement our
economic scheme of eliminating intellectual monopoly, it is
necessary to go beyond merely abolishing patents and copyright to
also disallow downstream licensing agreements.
To summarize: when we are discussing the elimination of
intellectual monopoly, we mean the elimination of patent and
copyright except for the right of sale. We also mean that the
government would not enforce downstream licensing agreements.
That is, shrink-wrap, or other agreements about how intellectual
property is to be used could not be enforced in the courts.
Since economists generally argue in favor of the
enforcement of private contracts, it may be a surprise that we will
be arguing against some of them in the name of competition.
However, there are two key elements of the usual argument in
favor of private contracts that are missing in the case of
downstream licensing.
First, downstream licensing impacts people who are not
party to the agreement. That is, if I purchase a book by signing a
private agreement not to resell copies, this agreement impinges on
the right of other people to buy the book from me. These kinds of
agreements, in which a group of people agrees to limit their
provision of some good or service, are usually called cartels and
are generally illegal under anti-trust law. If you and I, as owners of
bakeries, get together and sign a contract agreeing to limit the
number of loaves of bread we will sell, not only will the courts not
enforce that contract, but we will be subject to criminal
prosecution as well.
Second, economists recognize the important element of
transaction costs in determining which contracts should be
enforced. “Possession is 9/10ths of the law” is a truth in economics
as well as in common parlance. Take the case of slavery. Why
should people not be allowed to sign private contracts binding
them to slavery? In fact economists have consistently argued
against slavery – during the 19
th century David Ricardo and John
Stuart Mill engaged in a heated public debate with literaryBoldrin & Levine: Case Against Intellectual Monopoly, Chapter 1
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luminaries such as Charles Dickens – with the economists
opposing slavery, and the literary giants arguing in favor. The fact
is that our labor cannot be separated from ourselves. For someone
else to own our labor requires them to engage in intrusive and
costly supervision. Such transaction costs are socially damaging as
they imply violation of privacy and of essential civil liberties.
Hence they are commonly rejected on economic, not just moral,
grounds. Moreover, there is no economic reason to allow slavery.
With well functioning markets, renting labor is a good substitute
for owning it. And so we allow the rental of labor, but not the
permanent sale.
For intellectual property we are proposing the reverse:
allowing the permanent sale, but not rental. For with intellectual
property, possession belongs to the buyer and not to the seller. If
you sell me an idea, I now have that idea embodied either in me or
in an object I own. For you to control the idea requires intrusive
and costly supervision. Similarly if you sell me a book, a CD or a
computer file. In each case, I have physical control of the item, and
you can control its use only through intrusive measures. Moreover,
in the case of well-functioning markets, owning is a good
substitute for renting. Our basic argument against intellectual
monopoly is that markets will function well in its absence, and so
there is no need for a rental market as the latter only effectuates
intellectual monopoly.
We emphasize that it is not rental versus sale that is the
crucial distinction, but the presence of restrictions on the use made
of an idea. In the case of an idea, such as an invention or
mathematical formula, once you have passed the idea to me, rental
has little meaning, since I can neither return the idea to you, nor
promise to forget it after a fixed period of time. In the case of an
object embodying and idea, such as a book or CD, you may well
rent the object to me for a fixed period of time. However, in the
absence of intellectual monopoly effectuated by downstream
licensing, I am free to make a copy of the book or CD. There is no
economic objection to such a rental without downstream licensing;
on the other hand, while we would not prohibit such rentals, we
would not expect such rental markets to be widespread in the
absence of intellectual monopoly.
In addition to arguing for freedom of contract, economists
also generally argue in favor of well-defined property rights.
Secure property  rights are a fundamental pillar of a well
functioning market economy, leading to higher economic growth
and increased prosperity for all. Does not the presence of strongBoldrin & Levine: Case Against Intellectual Monopoly, Chapter 1
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intellectual property rights have a similar effect? No economic
agent exercises productive effort without the prospect of
controlling its fruits. What is true for physical effort must be true
for the intellectual one: if strong property rights provide good
incentives for the production of potatoes, must they not also
provide good incentives for the production of ideas? Is not
violation of patent or copyright theft? Can it be bad to steal
potatoes, but good to steal ideas?
We are not arguing against intellectual property, merely
against intellectual monopoly. We favor the right of sale, the right
to sell ideas. We argue that both the original innovator should have
that right, and that those who have purchased the idea should have
the same right to sell what is now their idea. We are not arguing
that while stealing potatoes is bad, stealing ideas is good. A record
producer who promises an artist a payment in exchange for a
musical production, and reneges on his promise is indeed guilty of
theft, and should be punished by the full force of the law. A movie
producer who is shown a copy of a script and who secretly copies
it and makes a movie out of it without paying the writer is indeed
guilty of theft, and should be punished by the full force of the law.
It is the regulation of ideas after their sale with which we disagree.
When you buy a potato you can eat it, throw it away, plant it or
make it into a sculpture. When you buy a potato you can use the
idea of a potato embodied in it to make better potatoes or to invent
french fries. Current laws allow producers of a CDs, books,
computer software or medical drugs to take this freedom away
from you. It is against this confounding of intellectual property
with intellectual monopoly against which we argue.
Everyone wants a monopoly, and all producers would
impose downstream licensing agreements if they could. No one
wants to compete against his own customers. Under current law
only producers of ideas do not have to do so. It is a long jump from
the assertion that innovators deserve compensation for their efforts
to the conclusion that current patent and copyright protection is the
best way of providing such reward. Statements such as “A patent is
the way of rewarding somebody for coming up with a worthy
commercial idea” abound in the business, legal and economic
press. But we shall see that there are many other ways in which
innovators are rewarded, most of them socially better than
copyright and patents.
The U.S. Constitution allows Congress “To promote the
progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times toBoldrin & Levine: Case Against Intellectual Monopoly, Chapter 1
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authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective
writings and discoveries.”  Our perspective as economists on
patents and copyright is a similar one: promoting the progress of
science and the useful arts is a crucial ingredient of economic
success, from solving such profound economic problems as
poverty, to such mundane economic problems as boredom. The
question we shall focus on is whether intellectual monopoly is
useful in promoting innovation and growth, or if, as we shall argue,
it stifles innovation and growth.
Traditionally, economists have been skeptical of
government intervention in markets, for example, through
regulation or trade-restrictions. Economists are also skeptical of
intellectual monopoly, and the economics literature in general
suggests that existing protections should be reduced.
In the case of regulation and free trade, economists
generally recognize that some regulation and trade-restrictions are
desirable. They also recognize that allowing some intervention
triggers rent-seeking behavior by would-be monopolists, and that
as a result it is most practical to focus on eliminating government
intervention. This is not the view with respect to intellectual
monopoly. Until recently conventional wisdom held that markets
could not function at all in its absence. As a result, the
conventional view has been that intellectual monopoly is an
unavoidable evil if we are to have any innovation at all.
Modern economic research has shown that markets can
function even in the absence of intellectual monopoly, and we shall
see that many markets already function and function well in its
absence. As a result, we take the same position on intellectual
monopoly that economists take on trade restrictions: although
some modest protection might be desirable in special cases, it is
more practical to focus on no-trade restrictions as a general rule.
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Inventions, Improvements, and Practice of Benjamin Thompson,
Colliery Engineer, 1847, p. 110, and is quoted in Lord. The data on
the spread of total horsepower between 1800 and 1815 and other
details are drawn from  The Cambridge Economic History of
Europe, Vol IV, Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press,
1965. As both the Lord and Carnegie works are out of copyright,
both are available online at the very good Rochester site on the
history of steam power http://www.history.rochester.edu/steam. A
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Science by David M. Levy and Sandra J. Peart, January 22, 2001,
available online at
http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/LevyPeartdismal.html. In
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copyright law, and was extremely incensed that his works could be
legally distributed in the U.S. without his permission. Ironically, a
limited form of slavery is still allowed in the music and sport
industries, where long-term contracts binding the artist or the
athlete to a particular studio or team are commonplace.
The quote about patents being the reward is taken from The
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rd 2001, page 42, with  italics added. The U.S.
Constitution is online at
http://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/constitution.overview.htm
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